3 hours ago
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Donald Trump’s intervention in Venezuela is not a one-off shock. It epitomises his approach of interventionist isolationism based on a revisionist, neo-nationalist agenda in which power is exercised bluntly, international rules are optional and alliances are transactional. In such a dog-eat-dog world, hesitation and ambiguity do not stabilise the system; they become vulnerabilities to be exploited by a volatile and predatory Washington.
The seizure of Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, combined with Trump’s renewed musings about acquiring Greenland, potentially by using the US military, should dispel any lingering illusion that this is merely erratic behaviour. It reflects a worldview in which sovereignty is conditional, spheres of influence are legitimate, and coercion is normalised when it delivers results in the interest of Trump and his administration. The real question now is not whether Europeans disapprove, but how pro-European liberal democratic forces respond. Three imperatives stand out.
The first is to oppose actions that undermine the international order. Trump’s Venezuela policy is not just about Latin America. It strikes at the foundations of international order by signalling that powerful states may override sovereignty when it suits them. Europe’s response has been cautious, even muted. That restraint is often justified by fear that confronting Washington could weaken US support for Ukraine at a decisive moment.
But this logic is wrong. Trump’s actions already undermine the case for defending Ukraine’s sovereignty. By normalising coercive regime change and by defining global spheres of influence, Washington echoes the very arguments Russia uses to legitimise its aggression. If great powers are entitled to reorder their neighbourhoods, why should Moscow stop at Ukraine and why should other global powers respect the sovereign rights of more vulnerable actors? Silence from Europe does not protect Kyiv; it weakens the case for its defence, invites Vladimir Putin to press on, and accelerates global disorder.
Appeasement does not restrain Trump. Nor does acquiescence preserve stability. It simply confirms that coercion works – and that Europe will continue to adapt rather than resist. So it is important that Europe’s leaders speak out, and the remarks by, for instance, Emmanuel Macron and Frank-Walter Steinmeier are heading in the right direction.
The second imperative is that Europe must rededicate existing capabilities to resilience and security. This is not only about investing more in future capabilities. It is about reorienting what already exists towards resilience, deterrence and sustained security. Europeans possess significant military, economic and industrial assets, but they remain fragmented, underused or politically constrained.
Resilience today means the ability to absorb shocks without capitulating to pressure. That includes energy systems, supply chains, industrial capacity and credible defence structures – but also whole-hearted support for Ukraine. Ukraine is not a peripheral concern; it is a frontline test of whether sovereignty still matters in Europe’s neighbourhood and beyond.
The risks of inaction are not theoretical. The same logic linking Venezuela and Greenland could be applied elsewhere. Russia may test similar arguments in places such as the Norwegian archipelago, Svalbard, invoking great-power prerogatives in the Arctic to probe European resolve. And US attempts to absorb Greenland might well be part of a broader agenda that seeks to weaken the European Union, further split Europeans and strengthen political forces ideologically aligned with Trumpism inside EU member states. Weakness invites experimentation.
The third imperative concerns unity. European unity is essential, but it cannot become an excuse for paralysis. If unity cannot be achieved, those governments that are unwilling to act – such as Hungary but also others on a case-by-case basis – must be excluded, and exclusion must have consequences. States that block collective action at the European level cannot continue to benefit fully from shared defence, security cooperation or industrial investment. Solidarity is a two-way street and not unconditional.
At the same time, Europe must widen its circle of cooperation. That includes close coordination with like-minded partners such as the UK, Norway, Canada, Japan, South Korea and Australia. It also means working with ideologically diverse countries where interests align, to maintain at least a minimum set of global guardrails. In a fractured world, pragmatic cooperation matters as much as shared values.
This is not about forming a new bloc. It is about preventing a slide into a global system where might makes right and coercion becomes routine.
Europe can’t prevent Trump from making destructive choices. But it can shape the incentives. If Washington moves on Greenland – or pursues similar acts of coercion – there must be costs. Not symbolic gestures, but measures that resonate domestically in the US and hurt Trump and his policy choices where it matters most: with his political base. Greenland is Europe’s credibility litmus test.
Trade, market access, regulatory cooperation and industrial partnerships all provide leverage. Deterrence requires signalling clearly that aggression carries consequences – not because Europe seeks confrontation, but because the absence of consequences invites escalation.
Trump’s Venezuela gambit is a symptom of a deeper disorder. The era in which Europeans could rely on others to uphold the rules while benefiting from restraint is over. The choice now is not between loyalty and independence, but between passivity and responsibility.
Europe cannot afford to drift, hoping volatility will pass. Nor can it buy security through silence. The world is becoming harsher, more transactional and less forgiving of weakness. Europe’s response must be to grow up: in other words to recognise that playing for time and acquiescing only increases its vulnerability.
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Fabian Zuleeg is chief executive and chief economist at the European Policy Centre
