Mirroring the far right on immigration backfired for Germany’s political centre | Johannes Hillje

6 hours ago 2

Germany’s next government will be a coalition of the political centre led by the conservative Friedrich Merz. That may sound like stability. Traditionally, a government made up of the two big centrist parties, the Social Democrats (SPD) and Merz’s Christian Democrats (CDU), has been called the grand coalition. But it is no longer grand and offers only an illusion of stability.

The SPD achieved its worst result in a national election since the second world war, with 16.4% of the vote. The CDU scored its second-worst result, with 28.5%. If you include the Greens and the Liberals, the parties that occupy the political ground from centre-left to centre-right won just over 60% of the votes cast.

At the same time, the fringes are getting stronger. However, the poles of the political spectrum are unequal in two respects. First, the far-right AfD achieved its strongest result ever (20.8%), while the Left party (Die Linke) is celebrating a comeback but, with 8.8% of the vote, it is not even half as strong as the AfD. The second difference: despite its rejection of Nato and the supply of further weapons to Ukraine, the Left is not as extreme as the AfD.

The AfD’s gains have come from all sides: it gained more than a million conservative votes, 720,000 from the SPD and 890,000 from the Liberals. In other words, the rise of the far right is an inglorious joint effort by the conservatives and the previous SPD-led government.

The SPD in effect allowed the AfD to become the strongest party among workers for the first time: 38% of German workers voted for the far right, while only 12% voted for the SPD. And even though the AfD was significantly stronger in eastern Germany (36%) than in west Germany (18%) overall, there was an alignment between east and west among working-class voters.

The AfD’s strongholds in the west are regions that are experiencing industrial structural change such as parts of the Ruhr area, Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate. This transition affects, in a broad sense, all energy-intensive industries such as the old coal sector and the car and chemical industries. All of these sectors are being converted to climate neutrality. The German Economic Institute has identified a regional correlation between a strong AfD and industries undergoing transformation. The climate transition triggers immense economic fears, and the SPD (and the Greens) have so far failed to allay them with a hopeful agenda.

The strengthening of the AfD by the conservatives, however, follows a familiar pattern: the CDU has hardened its rhetoric and position on migration, bringing it closer to the AfD’s policies. Merz lifted the AfD to the zenith of its influence in the run-up to the election by forming a parliamentary majority with it for the first time on a symbolic resolution on migration.

Without doubt, there is an urgent need for action on migration: several deadly attacks in which the suspects were asylum seekers demonstrated this in a horrific way shortly before the election. But the solutions do not lie in a rapprochement with the positions of the AfD, which are not only anti-European and likely to fall foul of Germany’s legal obligations, but would also stifle immigration needed to sustain Germany’s labour market. The AfD is strongest in regions where residents encounter the fewest foreigners. Migrants are scapegoats for most AfD voters, partly because of xenophobia, but partly because the party succeeds in turning economic fears into cultural anger.

The radically hardened discourse on migration also helped the Left party to mobilise votes. However, it was ultimately the Greens that made this leftwing success possible. Robert Habeck, the Greens’ candidate for chancellor, presented his own migration plan containing measures unusually harsh for progressives. He was appealing to conservative voters, but they were hardly likely to vote Green. Instead, Habeck opened up a space to the left of his party.

Yes, the Left also addressed bread-and-butter issues such as high rents and food prices, but it lacked any truly innovative proposals, which is why it is not really the new hope for the progressive camp. Nevertheless, the Left drew many voters away from the Greens.

The AfD is not unhappy with its new role as the biggest opposition party, because it is focused on its “Project 2029”. Unlike Project 2025, a 900-page blueprint for dismantling and disrupting the US government by a rightwing thinktank, this is less a plan for a coup d’état from within, but a strategy for gaining power. The AfD’s calculation: in a coalition with the SPD, the CDU will have to make painful compromises, which should lead to even more conservative voters switching to the AfD. If this happens, it could become the strongest force in the next election, expected in 2029.

Whether that switch actually occurs is entirely in the hands of the new government. Steady growth of the AfD is not a foregone conclusion. The new government must do a number of things: first, the CDU must abandon its attempt to weaken the AfD by speaking like the AfD. Instead, it must develop a modern conservative agenda for migration and the economy, as well as Europe’s defence and support for Ukraine.

Second, the SPD and CDU must not slow down the drive to modernise industry through climate action. Instead, the social anxieties of the middle and working classes must be addressed by creating clear prospects for jobs and regions.

Third, the new government must restore trust in mainstream politics by exemplifying a new culture of cooperation in the centre. According to the research institute Infratest dimap, 70% of German voters do not want the AfD to govern. This majority needs to be reassured; it needs to be addressed emotionally and empathetically.

If the new government takes such principles to heart, the AfD’s plan could quickly turn out to be hubris. In fact, what is really needed after this election is a Project 2029 in the progressive camp. Compelling ideas for a fair and climate-neutral society in a strong Europe were missing in this election campaign.

The SPD will hardly be able to achieve a substantial renewal while governing with the CDU. Progressive renewal in Germany must come now from the Greens, who have the freedom to do so in opposition. Their central task will be not to follow a rightwing mainstream, but to translate progressive positions into better solutions and make them mainstream.