It’s the liberal German dilemma: Merz is anathema, but he might stand up to Trump | John Kampfner

5 hours ago 2

Donald Trump and his lieutenants have done Germans an enormous favour. Perilously late in the day, the US president and special envoy to the Kremlin has alerted Germany and the rest of Europe that there is one fault line, and one alone, between democracy and autocracy. All other political issues facing the country pale into insignificance.

It seems that Friedrich Merz gets it, even if many in his country still don’t. Since winning Sunday’s election, the Christian Democrat (CDU) chancellor-elect has used every opportunity to warn of the dangers of the Trumpian new world order. He has not sought to provide reassurance, something that Germans tend to crave from their politicians.

He is emphasising jeopardy for two immediate reasons: he needs the forlorn Social Democrats (SPD), whose third place in the election marked a historic low, to join him in a government not in their image. He also needs to unlock a borrowing facility that will allow him to spend big on defence. But it is more than that. The penny seems to have dropped.

This was not his position before. He was one of those to argue that Germany needed to live within its means and that therefore the “debt brake” should not be tinkered with. He now accepts that a special, longer-term fund is required to pay for enhanced defence. The problem is that to be reformed it needs a two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament, because the rule was absurdly enshrined into the constitution in 2009.

Merz went into the election campaign last November confident in the view (he does not lack self-regard) that he could do business with Trump. An arch-Atlanticist, and a former chair of BlackRock investment house, he suggested he’d get along just fine with his fellow conservative in the White House; two fist-pumping men who were tough on immigration and all things “woke” and were eager to cut taxes and slash bureaucracy.

Then came Munich and the extraordinary assault on Europe, Ukraine, Germany and democracy led by Trump’s bilious vice-president, JD Vance, in front of the global establishment at the annual security conference.

For the French and Brits, the US about-turn and warm embrace of Vladimir Putin is horrifying. For Germans it is existential – and challenges the bedrock of their post-1945 state (or at least the western part).

Confronted by this crisis, many Germans have fallen into intense gloom. Last weekend, one acquaintance talked about the prospect of nuclear war. Another wondered whether he should sell his apartment “before the Russians invade, with the Americans’ blessing”. Berlin is one hour from the Polish border. The land is flat.

There is another response, a healthier one, which is to accept that the status quo ante will never return and that Germany needs to channel that anxiety into a more muscular approach towards defence and international relations.

Uncomfortable political choices will have to be made; a psychological transformation is required. Germany needs to shed the two tropes that have dominated much of its thinking, particularly since reunification in 1990. One of these goes: “We are so terrible, we can’t be trusted with anything military – can’t someone else make these problems go away?” The second says: “Unlike you, we’re over all things military; we’ve reached a higher plane.” The former is based in inferiority, the latter in superiority. They may be diametrically opposed, but they are often espoused by the same people – the “salon pacifists” who have influenced all political parties.

This complacency began to change when Putin invaded Ukraine in February 2022 (although days before, senior German diplomats were telling me he was “far too sensible” to take such an “irrational” step).

In the only courageous act of his time in office, Olaf Scholz presaged a harder-edged approach to Russia. The term Zeitenwende – an epoch-changing moment – was applied to his speech to parliament announcing a special €100bn (£83bn) defence fund and immediate assistance to Kyiv. Of all European states, Germany provided most military assistance to Ukraine – but it was always hesitant and late. Scholz and other leaders, including from the UK, are culpable in ensuring that, while Ukraine might not lose on the battlefield, it could never win. With the arms at its disposal, it would never have been able to take back the lands recently lost, let alone during the first invasion in 2014.

That is all over. Ukraine’s betrayal is definitive. Trump and Putin will see to that. Many Germans wonder who is next.

The 84% turnout last Sunday was remarkable, suggesting a country that cares deeply about what happens next. Yet many voters, particularly those who consider themselves on the centre left, were in a terrible bind. As was I, voting here for the first time.

With the SPD washed up, the Greens remained the alternative for some. Their priorities of climate and human rights (hence tough on Russia) retains an appeal. The surprise package was Die Linke (the Left), galvanised under younger leadership, with an uplifting, radical domestic agenda. But what about its position on Russia? Will it really side with the Putin-loving Alternative für Deutschland in voting against defence increases, in the name of a specious “peace”?

Which leaves Merz. In his approach to migration, his social agenda, and in his often confrontational personality, he is seen as anathema by many liberals. But might he stand up to Trump? Might he deliver on some of the domestic issues that have led so many voters to feel aggrieved? After four years of indecision at home and invisibility abroad, hard times have led to this hard leader.