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In 2017, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates spearheaded a blockade of Qatar, disrupting trade, stability and lives in the region. Their de facto leaders – the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, and Abu Dhabi’s then crown prince, Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, now president of the UAE – had forged a close alliance. The older man had eagerly promoted the younger Saudi royal in Washington and elsewhere, and was seen as his mentor. Riyadh borrowed aspects of the UAE’s model, and the countries together intervened – at huge cost – against Houthi rebels in Yemen. Together they sought to contain the Arab spring and backed authoritarian rule in Egypt, Bahrain and elsewhere.
Yet by 2023 the relationship had soured: the Saudi crown prince reportedly accused the UAE of “stabb[ing] us in the back”. Late last year the disputes became spectacularly public. In Yemen, Southern secessionists backed by the UAE made dramatic advances in oil-rich areas – before being forced out by Saudi-backed forces. Riyadh effectively described the UAE as threatening its national security. Saudi commentators voiced increasing contempt for the kingdom’s former partner. In turn, a senior Emirati official complained of “wickedness” in the media campaign against it.
Profound strategic differences and economic and political rivalry have severed the partnership. Saudi Arabia is focused on internal transformation and wants a stable region, conducive to investment. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine ended Riyadh’s isolation by the west for the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, broadening its diplomatic options.
The UAE has been far more activist in its foreign policy, convinced that fundamental changes – particularly in containing Islamist parties – are needed for long-term stability. It has also, increasingly, aligned itself with Israel. It has chafed at Saudi pressure to limit Opec production – and at companies decamping next door after Riyadh said government contracts were limited to those with regional headquarters in Saudi Arabia. There is competition for US favour; both countries have growing financial ties with the Trump family. Saudi Arabia seeks a mutual defence pact with Turkey and Pakistan; the UAE wants one with India.
No one expects this rupture to lead to the sort of full-blown confrontation seen with Qatar. Some analysts already detect a desire for de-escalation. Yet the impact is still likely to be profound.
Proxy politics are the norm for Gulf powers. But the UAE has appeared especially enthusiastic. It supported the warlord Khalifa Haftar in Libya to devastating effect, and despite its denials there is increasing evidence of its backing for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan’s brutal war. Some fear that it may escalate support for the RSF, with its record of atrocities, deepening Sudan’s fragmentation. There are concerns too about its role in Syria. Last month, Somalia accused the UAE of “hostile and destabilising actions” thanks to its growing ties with breakaway Somaliland.
Even if this rift can be contained, Saudi and Emirati interests are diverging. While their partnership alarmed many, the risk is that peace and reconstruction may become even harder to achieve in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. Without a cohesive regional strategy, the already fraught prospects for Palestinian statehood look even frailer. Gulf states are not the only ones who should fear the repercussions of this split.
