In front of a bank of screens on the boat’s bridge, the Swedish coastguard Jan Erik Antonsson shows on a live map on a laptop how many vessels of Russia’s “shadow fleet” there are in the area. “These green symbols are the shadow fleet,” he says. More than a dozen green triangles representing shadow fleet vessels pop up around the coastline of southern Sweden alone.
Every day hundreds of shadow fleet ships – unregulated ageing tankers from around the world in varying states of repair carrying oil from Russia to states including China and India – are moving through a relatively narrow passage in the Baltic.
What was previously hoped would effectively become “Nato lake” after Finland and Sweden joined Nato, has instead become a battleground for hybrid warfare and the shadow fleet, which move under various identities and change flags to circumvent western economic sanctions imposed on Moscow since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Some shadow ships are understood to be accompanied by Russian military vessels, others have planes following their route from above to make sure they get to their intended destination.
The Guardian was given rare access to the coastguard’s operations, accompanying KBV 003 from the port of Karlskrona on an eight-hour patrol of one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes.
“Sea traffic in the Baltic has increased somewhat copiously with the whole shadow fleet, but also with Nato ships, defence ships and the coastguard,” says the vessel’s captain, Joakim Håkansson. “So we try to get far out and show that we’re here.”
In the Bornholm strait, where shipping traffic is divided like a motorway, shadow fleet vessels pass less than 10 nautical miles off the coast of Sweden. In our vicinity off the rocky Blekinge archipelago, there are two.
Later the coastguard follows one, an oil tanker currently flagged in Malta that according to online maritime records has in the last two years also been flagged in the Marshall Islands under a different name. As long as vessels are in a country’s economic zone as opposed to its smaller territorial sea – at most 12 nautical miles offshore – the grounds for intervention are extremely limited, but as of July, the coastguard is allowed to contact the vessel to request information about the ship and its insurance. A crew member on the oil tanker says over the radio its last port of call was Primorsk, Russia, and it is carrying just under 30,000 metric tonnes of diesel. Its next stop, he says, is Aliağa in Turkey. Its end destination is impossible to know, but the Swedish coastguard is certain this ship is part of the Russian shadow fleet.

The radio call is part of a new government plan aimed at tightening checks on the shadow fleet amid fears of a serious oil spill. The vessels are under no obligation to respond, but so far the coastguard says ships have been cooperative.
“There are hundreds of [shadow] ships moving in the Baltic all the time. And it’s a lot for our little sea here,” says Håkansson. “We see ships that have never been seen in the Baltic before that we come across now.” They need to build a picture of how seaworthy the ships are, he says, “because if there was an oil accident with these ships there would be an oil catastrophe in the Baltic”.
Security in the Baltic has changed dramatically since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, says Håkansson. As well as the growing shadow fleet, there is increasing disturbance to satellite-based navigation systems, such as GPS, and Baltic authorities must keep a close eye on undersea infrastructure. In the event of an oil spill, the coastguard would be responsible for emergency response and clean-up. There is also a growing physical threat from the Russian military, as its presence has “stepped up” in the Baltic, says Håkansson.
Håkansson also comes across ships he strongly suspects of spying. “Before they had these research ships [for spying]. Lately they have been using cargo ships to do these operations,” he claims.

But unless there is evidence of an environmental crime, a fishing crime or some sea traffic crimes, the Swedish coastguard’s ability to act on such threats is extremely limited. According to the rules of the International Maritime Organization, the UN agency that deals with safety and security of shipping, “the shadow fleet is allowed to move freely in the whole of the Baltics”, says Jonatan Tholin, a preliminary investigation manager for the Swedish coastguard.
National law can only apply in a country’s territorial waters, in the country’s broader economic zone it is the legislation of the country that the flag is shipped in that counts.
The problems caused by the shadow fleet are exemplified by Eagle S, an oil tanker suspected of damaging five undersea cables by dragging its anchor between Finland and Estonia in December 2024. Finnish authorities filed charges against members of the crew, arguing that although the measures were carried out outside Finland, the effects of the crime materialised in Finland, meaning it falls into its jurisdiction. The crew members deny the charges.
However, Tholin believes the most dangerous risk of the shadow fleet is its uninsured vessels, which in the event of an oil spill could have huge financial and environmental costs. “It means it will be taxpayer, the state, who pays,” he says.